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STATEEENT OF THE CASE 
This is a brief in opposition to an appeal from an 
0~er revoking Appellant's driver's license. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On May 17, 1977, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
reviewed the order of the Department of Public Safety revoking 
Appellant's driver's license and upheld the order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the lower court's determination 
affirmed. 
STATEt1ENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 26, 1977, Appellant was arrested and charged 
with driving under the influence of alcohol. On being brought 
to tte police station, Appellant was asked to submit to a breath-
alyzer test after being informed of the implied consent law. 
Appellant refused to take the breathalyzer test~ 
Respondent, Georgia R. Shaw, reviewed these facts, took 
testimony, and revoked Appellant's license effective March 19, 
1977. The District Court Judge then found that the petitioner 
unreasonably refused to submit to a chemical test to determine 
the alcoholic content of his blood pursuant to the laws of the 
State of Utah (R, 11). 
ARGUEHENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURTS FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A CHEHICAL TEST tvAS UN-
REASONABLE SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT. 
This court in Gassman v. Darius, 543 P.2d 197 (1975) 
stated a well-known principle of appellate law, "We do not re-
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verse the trial judge unless he clearly eoes violence to 
the r, 
as they relate to his findings." ThE· facts of this case 
and ~' 
applicable law clearly support the Distirct Court's d t 
e errcinat 
that Appellant's refusal was unreasonable. 
Respondent disagrees w~ th the statement in Appellant•, 
brief that "The alternate test (blood) was readily available." 
(No transcipt was designated by the Appellant). The facts were 
that the breathalyzer test was readily available while the bloc:. 
alcohol test was not. The officer made that clear to the A~ 
pellant, explained it, read him the statute and then designated 
the test to be tc:.ken. The trial court obviously be·lieved these 
facts. 
The Appellant, would put the shoe on the wrong foot 
and have the c.fficer tried for unreasonableness. The officer's 
actions are not on re-trial. The only reason given and argued; 
the Appellant for refusing the breathalyzer test is that he be-
1 ieved it to be unreliable. Under these facts, if tr.e officer 
were on trial, he would have acted reasonably in requesting t~ 
breathalyzer test anyway. So found the trial court and we ask 
this court to uphold that finding. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID IN FACT UNREASONABLY REFUSE TO 
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 41-6-44.10. 
Appellant's brief attempts to use Elliot v. Doriur., 
557 P.2d 759 (1976), to argue the position that if the order 
-2-
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revol:ing Appellant's license is not overturned, this Court 
would be granting police officers absolute power to determine which 
test is to be used. Elliot seems to support this necessary 
result and in no way supports the Appellant's case. In fact, the 
holding of Elliot could dictate the necessary outcome of the case 
at tar, ie., that since tr.e alternate test was r,ot readily avail-
able, Appellant's refusal to take the available breathalyzer test 
v1as unreasonable, whether available or not. By statute, the 
test requested is presumed to be a reliable and reasonable one. 
Appellant contends his refusal was not unreasonable 
due to his fear of the unreliability of the breathalyzer test 
and that he should be given the choice. This court in Elliot 
stated: 
In construing the meaning of reasonable 
cause, in this subsection, ((c) of Utah 
Code Annotated 44-6-44.10), it is signi-
ficant the person is granted the right: to 
submit to a 'chemical test,' the choice of 
which is by statute, determined by the ar-
resting officer. A stated preference for 
another chemical test is not a reasonable 
cause for refusal of a requested test . 
... A person may not unilaterally determine 
one of the tests designated in subsection 
(a) of 41-6-44.10 to be unreliable; then 
on that alone, claim his refusal to submit 
to such test was with reasonable cause . 
... Plaintiff claims the subsection by the 
police officer, denied him a reliable test. 
Such is without merit. A chemical test 
specified by statute may not be deemed un-
reliable as a matter of law. The statute 
specifically deslgnates the arresting officer 
as the one to determine the test to be ad-
ministered. (Emphasis added). 
-3-
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The foregoing quotes demonstrate this court's in-
terpretation of the Utah ImpJied Consent Statute. 
All tests 1. 
dicated in the statute, including the breathalyzer tEst, are 
dee~ed by law to be realiable and reasonable. The officer~­
cides which test is to be taken. lvhen one is asked to submit 
to a particular test, he must, on his refusal to submit is 
ther, 
reviewed to determine if the refusal was reasonable. This 
court, as quoted above, said that a stated preference for a~~ 
chemical test and a fear that a particular test is unreliable a 
not solely reasonable causes for a refusal tc. take a particular 
test. This Appellant's only contention is, therefore, without 
rr.erit. The sole fact that the blood test requested, but was 
not readily available and would have caused undue delay and ris 
of losing the evidence, is an unreasonc-.ble ground for refusal. 
If he had some other valid reasons for refusal, the appellant 
might have been reasonable, but such is not the trial court's 
finding on the facts of this case. 
The above construction of Utah Code Annotated 41-~~. 
was incorporated into the code via amendment by the 1977 Utah 
Legislature. The 1977 amendments tc. this section provide in nc 
uncertain t.erms that the officer has discretion as to which tes· 
used and the tests are presumed to be reliable. (Breathalyzer 
tests have been used for years) . Subsection A of the latest 
statute grants the right to a contemporaneous test if desired. 
POINT III 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE THAT STATE 
HOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY LAWS DEAL S~VIFTLY 
-4-
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AND EFFICIENTLY WITH UNSAFE DRIVERS. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Dixon v. Love, on May 16, 1977, 
upheld an Illinois law authorizing revocation or suspension of 
a drivers license without preliminary hE,arings. The court ruled 
that holding prehearings in every case would impede administra-
tive efficiency and prove a danger to the public on the highways. 
This is just one example of how state courts are tightening their 
drunk driving laws. The 1977 amendments to its Implied Consent 
LaW show a definite concern for public safety. The policy behind 
these amendments is obviously due to tmdue delay tactics. Keeping 
the highways safe for the innocent driver seems certainly present 
in i.:his court's construction of the implied consent stat~:•tes 
even before the stat~:,tory amendments \'ient into effect. Utah's 
judicial decisions and legislative enactments have also reflected 
concern with the drunk driving problem. The District Court's 
finding certainly is in accord with policy and holdings by this 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
This court's statutory interpretation of the applicable 
law gives the peace officer discretion as to which available 
chemical test is to be used. The facts and applicable law 
clearly show that Appellant's refusal to take the breathalyzer 
test was unreasonable. A refusal to take the test offered due 
to fear of its unreliability and/or a stated preference for another 
test is clearly an unreasonable refusal. 
Respondent requests this court to uphold tt.e Trial 
Court's findings. 
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DATED this day of 
---------' 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. HANSE~ 
Attorney General 
236 State Ca~itol 
Salt LakE City, Utah 84114 
BRUCE ~-1. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitcl 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~~ILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-
pc;spondent this ___ day of January, 1978, to Robert M. HcRaeo, 
and Robert J. Haws, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, 370 
East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
BRUCE M. HALE 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
